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This paper attempts define reputational risk in financial 
intermediation and to identify the proximate sources of reputational 
risk facing financial services firms. It then considers the key drivers 
of reputational risk in the presence of transactions costs and 
imperfect information in financial markets, surveys empirical 
research in the literature on the impact of reputational losses 
imposed on financial intermediaries, and presents some new 
empirical findings. The paper then develops the link between 
reputational risk and exploitation of conflicts of interest in financial 
intermediation, arguably one of the most important threats to the 
reputational capital of financial firms. Finally, it considers some 
managerial requisites for dealing with both reputational risk and 
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Financial services comprise an array of "special" businesses. They are 
special because they deal mainly with other people's money, and because 
problems that arise in financial intermediation can trigger serious external costs. 
In recent years the role of various types of financial intermediaries has evolved 
dramatically. Capital markets and institutional asset managers have taken 
intermediation share from banks. Insurance activities conducted in the capital 
markets compete with classic reinsurance functions. Fiduciary activities for 
institutional and retail clients are conducted by banks, broker-dealers, life 
insurers and independent fund management companies. Intermediaries in each 
cohort compete as vigorously with their traditional rivals as with players in other 
cohorts, competition that has been intensified by deregulation and rapid 
innovation in financial products and processes. Market developments have 
periodically overtaken regulatory capabilities intended to promote stability and 
fairness as well as efficiency and innovation.  
  It is unsurprising that these conditions would give rise to significant 
reputational risk exposure for the financial firms involved. For their part, investors 
in banks and other financial intermediaries are sensitive to the going-concern 
value of the firms they own, and hence to the governance processes that are 
supposed to work in their interests. Regulators in turn are sensitive to the safety, 
soundness and integrity of the financial system, and from time to time will 
recalibrate the rules of the game. Market discipline, operating through the 
governance process, interacts with the regulatory process in ways that involve 
both costs and benefits to market participants and are reflected in the value of 
their business franchises. 
  Section 1 of this paper defines reputational risk and outlines the sources 
of reputational risk facing financial services firms. Section 2 considers the key 
sources of reputational risk in the presence of transactions costs and imperfect 
information.
1 Section 3 surveys available empirical research on the impact of 
                                                 
1 Earlier studies focusing on reputation include Chemmanur & Fulghieri (1994), Smith (1992), 
Walter & De Long (1995) and Smith & Walter (1997).   3 
reputational losses imposed on financial intermediaries, including the separation 
of reputational losses from accounting losses. Section 4 builds a link between 
exploitation of conflicts of interest and reputational risk. Section 5 considers 
managerial requisites for dealing with both reputational risk and conflicts of 
interest. Section 6 concludes. 
 
1. What is Reputational Risk? 
  Reputational risk in banking and financial services is associated with the 
possibility of loss in the going-concern value of the financial intermediary – the 
risk-adjusted value of expected future earnings. Reputational losses may be 
reflected in reduced operating revenues as clients and trading counterparties 
shift to competitors, increased compliance and other costs required to deal with 
the reputational problem – including opportunity costs – an increased firm-
specific risk perceived by the market. Reputational risk is often linked to 
operational risk, although there are important distinctions between the two. 
According to Basle II, operational risks are associated with people (internal fraud; 
clients, products and business practices, employment practices and workplace 
safety), internal processes and systems, and external events (external fraud, 
damage or loss of assets, and force majeure). Operational risk is specifically not 
considered to include strategic and business risk, credit risk, market risk or 
systemic risk, or reputational risk.
2 If reputational risk is bracketed-out of 
operational risk from a regulatory perspective, then what is it? A possible working 
definition is as follows:  
Reputational risk comprises the risk of loss in the value of a firm’s 
business franchise that extends beyond event-related accounting 
losses and is reflected in a decline in its share performance 
metrics. Reputation-related losses reflect reduced expected 
revenues and/or higher financing and contracting costs. 
Reputational risk in turn is related to the strategic positioning and 
execution of the firm, conflicts of interest exploitation, individual 
professional conduct, compliance and incentive systems, 
                                                 
2 Basle II at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm.    4 
leadership and the prevailing corporate culture. Reputational risk is 
usually the consequence of management processes rather than 
discrete events, and therefore requires risk control approaches that 
differ materially from operational risk. 
 
  According to this definition, a reputation-sensitive event might occur which 
triggers an identifiable monetary decline in the market value of the firm. After 
subtracting from this market capitalization loss the present value of direct and 
allocated costs such as fines and penalties and settlements under civil litigation, 
the balance can be ascribed to the impact on the firm’s reputation. Firms that 
promote themselves as reputational standard-setters will, accordingly, tend to 
suffer larger reputational losses that firms that have taken a lower profile – that 
is, reputational losses associated with identical events according to this definition 
may be highly idiosyncratic to the individual firm. 
  In terms of the overall hierarchy of risks faced by financial intermediaries, 
reputational risk is perhaps the most intractable. In terms of Exhibit 1, market risk 
is usually considered the most tractable, with adequate time-series and cross-
sectional data availability, appropriate metrics to assess volatility and 
correlations, and the ability to apply techniques such as value at risk (VaR) and 
risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC). Credit risk is arguably less tractable, 
given that many credits are on the books of financial intermediaries at historical 
values. The analysis of credit events in a portfolio context falls short of market 
risk, although many types of credits have over the years become “marketized” 
through securitization structures such as asset-backed securities (ABS) and 
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) as well as derivatives such as credit 
default swaps (CDS). These are priced in both primary and secondary markets, 
and transfer some of the granularity and tractability found in market risk to the 
credit domain. Liquidity risk, on the other hand, has both pluses and minuses in 
terms of tractability – in continuous markets liquidity risk can be calibrated in 
terms of bid-offer spreads, although in times of severe market stress and flights 
to quality liquidity can disappear.  
  If the top three risk domains in Exhibit 1 show a relatively high degree of   5 
manageability, the bottom three are less so. Operational risk is a composite of 
highly manageable risks with a robust basis for suitable risk metrics together with 
risks that represent catastrophes and extreme values – tail events that are 
difficult to model and in some cases have never actually been observed. Here 
management is forced to rely on either simulations or external data to try to 
assess the probabilities and potential losses. Meanwhile, sovereign risk 
assessment basically involves applied political economy and relies on imprecise 
techniques such as stylized facts analysis, so that the track record of even the 
most sophisticated analytical approaches is not particularly strong – especially 
under conditions of macro-stress and contagion. As in the case of credit risk, 
sovereign risk can be calibrated when sovereign foreign-currency bonds and 
sovereign default swaps (stripped of non-sovereign attributes like external 
guarantees and collateral) are traded in the market. This leaves reputational risk 
as perhaps the least tractable of all – with poor data, limited usable metrics, and 
strong “fat tail” characteristics. 
  The other point brought out in Exhibit 1 relates to the linkages between the 
various risk-domains. Even the most straightforward of these – such as between 
market risk and credit risk – are not easy to model or to value, particularly in a bi-
directional form. There are 36 such linkages, exhibiting a broad range of 
tractability. We would contend that the linkages which relate to reputational risk 
are among the most difficult to assess and to manage. 
 
  2. Sources of Reputational Risk 
    Where does reputational risk in financial intermediation originate? We argue 
that is emanates in large part from the intersection between the financial firm and 
the competitive environment, on the one hand, and the direct and indirect 
network of controls and behavioral expectations within which the firm operates on 
the other, as depicted generically in Exhibit 2.
3 The franchise value of a financial 
institution as a going concern is calibrated against these two sets of benchmarks.   6 
One of them, market performance, tends to be relatively transparent and easy to 
reward or punish. The other - performance against corporate conduct 
benchmarks - is far more opaque but potentially critical as a source of risk to 
shareholders. 
  Management must work to optimize against both sets of benchmarks. If it 
strays too far in the direction meeting the demands of social and regulatory 
controls, it runs the risk of poor performance in the market, punishment by 
shareholders, and possibly a change in corporate control. If it strays toward 
unrestrained market performance and sails too close to the wind in terms of 
questionable market conduct, its behavior may have disastrous results for the 
firm, its managers and its shareholders. In the end, striking this balance is a key 
corporate governance issue. 
  Such are the rules of the game, and financial intermediaries have to live 
with them. But they are not immutable. There is constant tension between firms 
and regulators about appropriate constraints on corporate conduct. Sometimes 
financial intermediaries win battles (and even wars) leading to periods of 
deregulation. Sometimes it’s possible to convince the public that self-regulation 
and market discipline are powerful enough to obviate the need for external 
control. Sometimes the regulators can be convinced, one way or another, to go 
easy. Then along comes another major transgression and the constraint system 
reacts and creates a spate of new regulations. A wide array of interests get into 
this constant battle to define the rules under which financial business gets done 
— managers, politicians, the media, activists, investors, lawyers, accountants — 
and eventually a new equilibrium gets established which will define the rules of 
engagement for the period ahead.  
  There are some more fundamental things at work as well. Laws and 
regulations governing the market conduct of firms are not created in a vacuum. 
They are rooted in social expectations as to what is appropriate and 
inappropriate, which in turn are driven by values imbedded in society. These 
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values are rather basic. They deal with lying, cheating and stealing, with trust and 
honor, with what is right and what is wrong. These are the ultimate benchmarks 
against which conduct is measured and can be the origins of key reputational 
losses. 
  But fundamental values in society may or may not be reflected in people’s 
expectations as to how a firm’s conduct is assessed. There may be a good deal 
of slippage between social values and how these are reflected in the public 
expectations of business conduct. Such expectations are nevertheless important 
and the build-up of adverse opinion in the media, the formation of special-interest 
lobbies and pressure-groups, and the general tide of public opinion with respect 
to one or another aspect of market conduct can be reputationally debilitating. 
  Moreover, neither values nor expectations are static in time. Both change. 
But values seem to change much more gradually than expectations. Indeed, 
fundamental values such as those noted above are probably as close as one 
comes to "constants" in assessing business conduct. But even in this domain 
things do change. As society becomes more diverse and mobile, for example, 
values tend to evolve. They also differ across cultures. And they are sometimes 
difficult to interpret. Is lying to clients or to trading counterparties wrong? What is 
the difference between lying and bluffing? Is it only the context that determines 
how particular behavior is assessed? The same conduct may be interpreted 
differently under different circumstances - interpretation that may change 
significantly over time and differ widely across cultures, giving rise to unique 
contours of reputational risk. 
  There is additional slippage between society’s expectations and the 
formation of public policy, and the activities of public interest groups. Things may 
go on as usual for awhile despite occasional media commentary about 
inappropriate behavior of a firm or an industry in the marketplace. Then some 
sort of social tolerance limit is reached. A firm goes too far. A confluence 
emerges among various groups concerned with the issue. The system reacts 
through the political process and a new set of constraints on firm behavior   8 
emerge, possibly anchored in legislation, regulation and bureaucracy. Or the firm 
is subject to class action litigation.
4 Or its reputation is so seriously compromised 
that its share price drops sharply. 
  As managers review the reputational experiences of their competitors, 
they cannot escape an important message. Most financial firms can endure a 
credit loss or the cost of an unsuccessful trade or a broken deal, however large, 
and still survive. These are business risks that the firms have learned to detect 
and limit their exposure before the damage becomes serious. Reputational 
losses may be imposed by external reactions that may appear to professionals 
as unfocused or ambiguous, even unfair. They may also be new — a new 
reading of the rules, a new finding of culpability, something different from the way 
things were done before. Although regulators and litigants, analysts and the 
media are accepted by financial professionals as a fact of life, such outsiders can 
become susceptible to public uproar and political pressure, during which times it 
is difficult to take the side of an offending financial firm.
5 
  In the United States, for example, tighter regulation and closer 
surveillance, aggressive prosecution and plaintiff litigation, unsympathetic media 
and juries, and stricter guidelines for penalties and sentencing make it easier to 
get into trouble and harder to avoid serious penalties. Global brokerage and 
trading operations, for example, involve hundreds of different, complex and 
constantly changing products that are difficult to monitor carefully under the best 
of circumstances. Doing this in a highly competitive market, where profit margins 
are under constant challenge and there is considerable temptation to break the 
rules, is even more challenging. Performance-driven managers, through 
compensation and promotion practices, have sometimes unwittingly encouraged 
behavior that has inflicted major reputational damage on their firms and brought 
some of them down. 
  The reality is that the value of financial intermediaries suffers from such 
                                                 
4 For a discussion, see Capiello (2006). 
5 For a full examination of these issues, see Smith & Walter (1997).   9 
uncertain reputation-sensitive conditions. Since maximizing the value of the firm 
is supposed to be the ultimate role of management, its job to learn how to run the 
firm so that it optimizes the long-term trade-offs between profits and external 
control. It does no good to plead unfair treatment — the task is for management 
to learn to live with it, and to make the most of the variables it can control.  
  The overall process can be depicted in a graphic such as Exhibit 3, 
representing the firm and its internal governance processes in the center and 
various layers of external controls affecting both the firm’s conduct and the 
reputational consequences of misconduct, ranging from “hard” compliance 
components near the center to “soft” but potentially vital issues of “appropriate” 
conduct in the periphery. Clearly, serious reputational losses can impact a 
financial firm even if it is fully in compliance with regulatory constraints and its 
actions are entirely legal. The risk of reputational damage incurred in these outer 
fringes of the web of social control are among the most difficult to assess and to 
manage. Nor is the constraint system necessarily consistent, with important 
differences in regulatory regimes (as well as expectations regarding responsible 
conduct) across markets in which a firm is active – so that conduct which is 
considered acceptable in one environment may give rise or significant 
reputational risk in another. 
 
3. Valuing Reputation Risk 
  Recent research has attempted to quantify the impact of reputation risk on 
share prices during the 1980s and 1990s.
6 Given the nature of the problem, most 
of the evidence has been anecdotal, although a number of event studies have 
been undertaken in cases where the reputation-sensitive event was “clean” in 
terms of the release of the relevant information to the market.  
  Exhibit 4 summarizes shareholder value losses in a reputation-sensitive 
situation involving the aforementioned sources of loss – (1) Client defections and 
revenue erosion; (2) Increases in monetary costs comprising accounting writeoffs   10 
associated with the event, increased compliance costs, regulatory fines and legal 
settlements as well as indirect costs related to loss of reputation such as higher 
financing costs, contracting costs and opportunity costs – including “penalty box” 
suspension by the regulators from particular business activities; and (3) An 
increases in firm-specific (unsystematic) risk assigned by the market as a result 
of the reputational event in question. In order to value the pure reputational 
losses, it is necessary to estimate the overall market value loss of the firm to a 
reputation-sensitive event and subtract from it the monetary losses identified in 
italics in Exhibit 4. 
  Consider the following example:
7 On December 28, 1993, the Bank of 
Spain took control of the country's fourth largest bank, Banco Español de Crédito 
(Banesto). Subsequently, shares of JP Morgan & Co., a U.S. bank holding 
company closely involved with Banesto, declined dramatically. Such a reaction 
appeared inconsistent with market rationality, given that the impact of the event 
on Morgan's bottom line was trivial (the accounting loss to Morgan was unlikely 
to exceed $10 million after taxes). Perhaps something more than the underlying 
book value of JP Morgan & Co. was moving the price of the stock, i.e., the 
central bank takeover of Banesto may have affected the value of Morgan's 
corporate franchise in some of the firm's core business areas, notably securities 
underwriting, funds management, client advisory work and its ability to manage 
conflicts of interest that can accompany such activities in non-transparent 
environments. 
  JP Morgan was involved in Banesto in four ways, in addition to normal 
interbank transactions relationships:
8 (1) In May 1992, it began raising funds for 
the Corsair Partnership, L.P., aimed at making non-controlling investments in 
financial institutions. By February 1993, Morgan had raised over $1 billion from 
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46 investors that included pension funds and private individuals. Morgan served 
as General Partner and fund manager, with an investment of $100 million. The 
Corsair Partnership's objective was to identify troubled financial institutions and, 
by improving their performance, earn a significant return to shareholders in the 
fund. The Corsair Partnership's first investment, undertaken in February 1993, 
was a share purchase of $162 million in Banesto – giving Morgan a $16.2 million 
equity stake in the Spanish bank. (2) A vice-chairman of JP Morgan served on 
the Spanish bank's board of directors. (3) Morgan was directly advising Banesto 
on its financial and business affairs. (4) As part of an effort to recapitalize 
Banesto, Morgan was lead underwriter during 1993 of two stock offerings that 
totaled $710 million. 
  Corsair Partnership, L.P. was intended to search for troubled financial 
institutions in the United States and abroad. The objective was to restructure 
such institutions by applying Morgan's extensive expertise and contacts. Morgan 
indicated that Corsair investors could expect a 30% annual return over ten years. 
Although Morgan had a separate investment banking subsidiary (JP Morgan 
Securities Inc.), Corsair was believed to be the first equity fund organized and 
managed by Morgan since the Glass-Steagall Act separated banking and 
securities activities in 1933 – a separation which eventually lasted until 1999. The 
business concept of searching for troubled financial institutions emerged from a 
time of turmoil in the U.S. and foreign banking sectors. When the U.S. banking 
industry started to improve as a result of a favorable interest rate environment, 
Corsair ventured abroad. Corsair's first stake in Banesto was taken in February 
1993. By August 1993, it had invested $162 million (23% of the funds raised) in 
the Spanish bank. The overall J.P. Morgan – Banesto relationship is depicted in 
Exhibit 5. 
  Banesto's problems stemmed from rapid growth and a convoluted 
structure of industrial holdings followed by a serious downturn in the Spanish 
economy. The bank's lending book increased from Pta.4 trillion in 1988 to Pta2.3 
trillion in 1991, a period when its competitors were growing at a quarter of that   12 
rate. Banesto bid aggressively for deposits, increasing interest rates by 51% 
while competitors increased theirs by 40%. When the Spanish economy 
weakened, the bank was stuck with an array of bad loans and that the group was 
further burdened by losses on its industrial holdings. In October 1992, a partial 
audit by the Bank of Spain was forced to lend the troubled institution "a 
substantial amount". An audit released at the end of December 1993 revealed 
that Banesto assets of Pta5.5 trillion ($385 billion) were overvalued in excess of 
Pta50 billion ($3.5 billion). In April 1994, Banesto was bought for $2.05 billion by 
Banco Santander, leaving costs of $3.7 billion to be borne by the Spanish banks 
and by taxpayers. 
  Morgan had been advising Banesto on various deals since 1987. In July 
1992, Morgan's  involvement became more intensive when it began advising 
Banesto on how to raise capital. By August 1993, Morgan had assisted Banesto 
in two rights issues to raise $710 million. During the time of these rights issues, 
Corsair invested $162 million in Banesto. In a letter dated December 27, 1993, 
Morgan wrote to the Bank of Spain's Governor, outlining how Banesto could 
continue to raise capital, including a bond issue that Morgan was planning to 
launch in the first quarter of 1993. 
  Instead, the Bank of Spain took control of Banesto on the following day, 
December 28, 1993. Citing mismanagement and reckless lending, the Governor 
justified the action in order to avoid a run on the deposits of the bank, whose 
share prices were falling sharply on the Madrid Exchange. Given Morgan's 
multifaceted involvement in Banesto and potential conflicts imbedded in that 
relationship, the announcement of the takeover could have had a large effect on 
the value of Morgan's reputation and business franchise and hence its stock 
price.  
  In order to test the impact of the Banesto case on the JP Morgan share 
price, we use conventional event study methodology.
9 We create a sample 
                                                 
     
9 De Long & Walter (1994). For event study methodology, see Brown and Warner (1985).   13 
prediction of returns on Morgan stock and compare the predicted returns with 
actual returns on Morgan shares after the Banesto event announcement. The 
difference is considered the excess return attributable to the event. In order to 
create this prediction, we regress the daily return of Morgan stock on the daily 
return on the market index as well as on an industry-group index.
10 We use data 
from 300 days to 50 days prior to the announcement date (December 28). The 
resulting coefficients are then multiplied by the returns on the market and 
industry indices from 50 days prior to 50 days after the announcement, in order 
to obtain an estimation of the daily stock return during this period. Then, the 
excess return is calculated at the "predicted" return minus the actual Morgan 
stock returns for the period, and the cumulative excess return is plotted. In order 
to translate these results into the monetary effect on JP Morgan stock, the 
cumulated excess return is multiplied by the total market value of equity (shares 
outstanding times price per share) 50 days before the announcement. In effect, 
this amount represents the difference between what shareholders would have 
received had they sold their shares in the market 50 days prior to the 
announcement and the industry's stocks, and what they would have received if 
they had sold them on subsequent days. If the reputation-effect hypothesis is 
correct, the market response to the Bank of Spain's announcement on 28 
December 1993 should have significantly exceeded the firm's book exposure to 
Banesto. 
  We regressed Morgan's stock returns against the value-weighted NYSE 
index
11 and the industry group composed of 20 banking and securities firms. We 
                                                 
     
10 The industry group index included 20 financial institutions with characteristics showing 
some degree of overlap with those of JP Morgan. This is the unweighted average of share prices 
for Banc One, BankAmerica, Bank of boston, Bank of New York, Bankers Trust NY, Barnett 
Bank, Bear Stearns, Chase Manhattan, Chemical Bank, Citicorp, Continental Bank, First 
Chicago, First Fidelity Bancorp, First Virginia, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Group, NationsBank, 
Paine Webber Group, Salomon Inc. and Wells Fargo. 
     
11 While autocorrelation can be a problem in using daily stock returns, JP Morgan stock was 
heavily traded, so that daily carryover is unlikely to be significant. Indeed, when we controlled the 
industry for this potential problem by including the lagged market index as a regression, the   14 
obtained the following model, estimated over days -300 to -50 prior to the 
announcement date: 
RJPMt = -0.00014 + 0.5766*RMt + 0.2714*RGt + ut 
where    
RJPMt   =  Return on JP Morgan stock;  
RMt   =  Return on NYSE composite (value-weighted) index; 
RGt   =  Return on group of companies in the same industry. 
  The excess return attributable to the event is the calculated residual (ut) 
from 50 days prior to 50 days after the announcement.
12 Chart 2 shows the 
cumulative ut. Prior to the announcement, Morgan stock behaved as predicted 
based on its behavior during the 250 days before the event period. A few days 
before announcement, the return began to decline. Thereafter, an essentially 
steady decline occurred. A cumulative loss of 10% of shareholder equity value is 
apparent 50 days after the announcement. Chart 3 shows this shareholder value 
loss in monetary terms. It suggests that the 10% loss in shareholder value 
translates into a loss in JPM market capitalization of approximately $1.5 billion 
versus a maximum direct loss of only $10 million from the Banesto failure. This 
analysis suggests that the loss of an institution's franchise value can far outweigh 
an accounting loss when its reputation is called into question, a finding similar to 
that of Smith (1992) in the case of Salomon Brothers, Inc. 
  Reasons for the adverse market reaction can only be conjectured. The 
takeover of Banesto could have been seen as compromising Morgan's reputation 
in precisely those areas key to its future. Inability to turn Banesto around may 
have called into question Morgan's ability to successfully advise clients. Banesto 
as the dominant participation in the Corsair portfolio may have suggested flaws in 
                                                                                                                                                 
resulting coefficient was negative and statistically insignificant. 
     
12 A careful search was undertaken covering the 50 days after the event to check for further 
announcements that could have affected the JP Morgan share price. On January 14, 1994, 
Morgan announced that net earnings for the fourth quarter of 1993 were up by 77%. Despite an 
increase in earnings, therefore, stock prices fell during the period examined. Besides the 
statement on earnings, no other announcements occurred during the period.   15 
Morgan's ability to organize and manage certain equity funds. Underwriting stock 
and placing them with important investor clients raises questions about its ability 
to judge risks in underwriting securities. Service on Banesto's Board suggests 
problems with monitoring and the configuration of Morgan's various involvements 
with Banesto suggests the potential for conflicts of interest or lack of objectivity. 
Whatever the linkages, here was a case of a financial services firm of 
exceedingly high standing, which in no way violated and legal or regulatory 
constraints but whose shares nevertheless appeared to have been adversely 
affected by the market reaction to the way a high-profile piece of business was 
handled. 
  In recent years, event studies such as this have yielded a growing body of 
evidence as to the share price sensitivity to reputational risk. For example, 
Cummins, Lewis and Wei (2006) undertook a large sample study of operational 
and reputational events contained in the Fitch OpVar
™ database. Exhibit 6 shows 
the results in terms of the magnitude of the losses using three-factor estimation 
models in terms of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and number of trading 
days before and after the announcement. The authors, however, do not 
distinguish between operational losses and reputational losses, as defined 
above. 
De Fontnouvelle et al. (2006) use loss data from the Fitch OpVar
™ and 
SAS OpRisk
™ databases to model operational risk for banks that are 
internationally active. In a series of robust statistical estimates, they find a high 
degree of regularity in operational losses that are both quantifiable and 
consistent with large amount of capital increasingly reported by major banks as 
being held against operational risk – which in many cases exceeds capital held 
against market risk – see Exhibits 7 and 8. The paper also segments the losses 
by event type and by activity line, as well as whether or not the operational 
losses occurred in the United States. The largest losses involved retail and 
commercial and retail/private banking activities in terms of type of event. As in 
the case of other studies, the authors do not distinguish the associated   16 
accounting losses due to legal settlements, fines, penalties and other explicit 
operational risk-related costs from reputational losses, and as such these 
estimates are relevant from a regulatory perspective but probably materially 
understate the losses to shareholders.  
  In a pilot study of 49 reputation-sensitive events, using the aforementioned 
definition and excluding operational events, we find negative mean CARs of up to 
7% and $3.5 billion, depending on the event windows used. Exhibit 9 shows the 
results graphically and the tables in Exhibits 10 and 11 show the numerical 
results. We do not, however, distinguish between the associated monetary 
losses and the pure reputational losses.
13 
  The only study so far which attempts to identify pure reputational losses is 
Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2006). The authors attempt to distinguish book losses 
from reputational losses in the context of US Securities and Exchange 
Commission enforcement actions related to earnings restatements – “cooking the 
books.” The authors review 2,532 regulatory events in connection with all 
relevant SEC enforcement actions during 1978-2002 and the monetary costs of 
these actions in the ensuing period, through 2005. These monetary costs are 
then compared with the cumulative abnormal returns estimated from event 
studies to separate them from the reputational costs. The results are depicted in 
Exhibit 12 – note that the reputational losses (66%) are far larger than the cost of 
fines (3%), class action settlements (6%) and accounting writeoffs (25%) 
resulting from the events in question. 
 
4. Reputational Risk and Conflicts of interest 
  One of the key sources of reputational risk in the financial services sector 
is the exploitation of conflicts of interest.   Potential conflicts of interest are a fact 
of life in the financial services industry, and always will be. The question is 
whether they are exploited, and thereby impose agency costs on others. In 
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and Anthony Saunders.   17 
recent years, the role of banks, securities firms, insurance companies and asset 
managers have become enmeshed in alleged abusive practices – as facilitators 
in various corporate scandals, acting simultaneously as principals and 
intermediaries in various high-profile transactions, for example. This has turned 
the attention of supervisory authorities, public prosecutors, legislators and the 
conflict of interest issue.
14 
  In this section we note that conflict-of-interest exploitation requires 
information asymmetries, transaction costs and market frictions - in perfect 
markets, conflicts of interest cannot be exploited. We argue that conflict of 
interest exploitation is sensitive to the strategic positioning of the financial 
intermediary, as well as strategic execution and the intensity of performance 
pressure imposed on individual business units. Finally, we suggest that 
appropriate conflict of interest diagnostics can promote sensible safeguards 
against the reputational exposure involved. 
  There are essentially two kinds of conflicts of interest confronting firms in 
the financial services industry: (Type-1) Conflicts between the firm’s own 
economic interests and the interests of its clients. Examples include exploiting 
conflicts of interest in order to enhance the firm’s profitability or market-share, or 
to transfer risk. (Type-2) Conflicts of interest may develop between the firm’s 
clients (or between types of clients) which place the firm in a position of favoring 
one at the expense of another. Behavior that systematically favors corporate 
clients over retail investors in the presence of asymmetric information is an 
example of this type of conflict. (Walter, 2004) 
  Each of these types of conflicts of interest may arise either in inter-
professional activities carried out in wholesale financial markets or in activities 
involving retail clients. The distinction between these two domains is important 
because of the key role of information asymmetries and transactions costs, which 
differ dramatically between the two broad types of market participants. 
                                                 
14 A survey of the economics of conflicts of interest can be found in Demsky (2003). Analysis of 
conflicts of interest applied to the financial services industry includes Herman (1975), Krozner &   18 
Consequently, their vulnerability to conflict-exploitation differs significantly, and 
measures designed to remedy the problem in one domain may be inappropriate 
in the other. In addition there are what we term “domain-transition” conflicts of 
interest, which run between the two domains and whose impact can be 
particularly troublesome. 
Conflicts of interest in wholesale financial markets are depicted in Exhibit 
13. For example, a financial intermediary may be involved as a principal with an 
equity stake in a transaction in which it is also serving as adviser, lender or 
underwriter, creating an incentive to act in its own interest and against those of 
its clients or third parties. Or a financial intermediary may use its lending power to 
influence a client to use its securities or advisory services as well – or the 
reverse, denying credit to clients that refuse to use other (more profitable) 
services. Or the asset management unit of a financial institution may be 
pressured by a corporate banking client into proxy-voting of shares in that 
company for management’s position in a contested corporate action. Or a 
multifunctional financial firm may act as trading counterparty for its own fiduciary 
clients, as when the firm’s asset management unit sells or buys securities for a 
fiduciary client while its affiliated broker-dealer is on the other side of the trade. 
Or a financial intermediary may exploit institutional, corporate or other wholesale 
clients by executing proprietary trades in advance of client trades that may move 
the market.  
All of these represent exploitation of Type-1 conflicts, which set the firm’s 
own interest against those of its clients in wholesale, interprofessional 
transactions. Type-2 conflicts dealing with differences in the interests of multiple 
wholesale clients center predominantly on two issues: (1) A financial intermediary 
may obtain private information about a client, which in turn may be used in ways 
that harm the interests of that client; or (2) A financial firm may have a 
relationship with two or more clients who are themselves in conflict.  
Conflicts of interest in retail financial markets are depicted in Exhibit 14. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Strahan (1999), Saunders (1985) and Schotland (1980).  
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All such conflicts appear to be Type 1 conflicts, which set the interests of the 
financial intermediary itself against the interests of its clients. They include biased 
client advice based on a “salesman's stake” in promoting high-margin “house” 
products over lower-margin third-party products, based on incentives that are 
rarely transparent to the retail client. Or retail clients may be pressured to acquire 
additional financial services on unfavorable terms in order to access a particular 
product, such as the purchase of credit insurance tied to consumer or mortgage 
loans. Or a financial firm that is managing assets for clients may exploit its 
agency relationship by engaging in excessive trading which creates higher costs. 
Or clients may be encouraged to leverage their investment positions through 
margin loans from the firm, exposing them to potentially unsuitable levels of 
market risk and high credit costs. Or there may be misuse of personal 
information by a firm under intense pressure to cross-sell. 
Conflicts of interest exploitation may also transition the wholesale and 
retail domains, as depicted in Exhibit 15 This can involve either Type-1 or Type-2 
conflicts, and sometimes both at the same time. One example is the classic 
conflict between a firm’s “promotional role” in raising capital for clients in the 
financial markets and its obligation to provide suitable investments for retail 
clients.
15 Or a financial firm that is acting as an underwriter or has or acquired 
securities in a secondary market trade may be unable to resell them at an 
acceptable price and may seek to cut its exposure to loss by allocating unwanted 
securities to investment accounts over which it has discretion. Or analysts 
working for sell-side firms in diverse and fundamentally incompatible roles may 
encounter intractable conflicts in taking views on listed equities. Or a bank with 
credit exposure to a client whose bankruptcy risk has increased (to the private 
knowledge of the banker) may have an incentive to assist the corporation in 
issuing bonds or equities to the general public, with the proceeds used to pay-
                                                 
15 A well-known version of this conflict involves biased research. See Attorney General of the 
state of New York (2003).  
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down the bank’s loans. 
Aside from this basic taxonomy of conflict of interest exploitation, we posit 
that the broader the range of a financial  intermediary’s activities, (1) the greater 
the likelihood that the firm will encounter exploitable conflicts of interest, (2) the 
higher will be the potential agency costs facing its clients, and (3) the more 
difficult and costly will be the safeguards necessary to prevent conflict of interest 
exploitation. If this proposition is correct, agency costs associated with conflicts 
of interest can easily offset the realization of economies of scope in financial 
services firms – scope economies that are supposed to generate benefits on the 
demand side through cross-selling (revenue synergies) and on the supply side 
through more efficient use of the firm’s business infrastructure (cost synergies). 
As a result of conflict exploitation the firm may win and clients may lose in the 
first instance, but subsequent adverse reputational and regulatory consequences 
(along with efficiency factors such as the managerial and operational cost of 
complexity) can be considered diseconomies of scope. 
Breadth of engagement with clients may create conflicts of interest that 
can be multidimensional, and involve a number of different stakeholders at the 
same time. Several examples came to light during the corporate scandals in the 
early 2000s. Following the $103 billion bankruptcy of WordCom in 2002, for 
example, it appeared that Citigroup - a multifunctional, global financial 
conglomerate - was serving as equity analyst supplying assessments of 
WorldCom to institutional and (through the firm’s brokers) retail clients, while 
simultaneously advising WorldCom management on strategic and financial 
matters. Citigroup’s equity analyst at times participated in WorldCom’s board 
meetings. As a major telecommunications-sector commercial and investment 
banking client, Citigroup maintained an active lending relationship with 
WorldCom and successfully competed for its securities underwriting business. At 
the same time, Citigroup served as the exclusive pension fund adviser to 
WorldCom and executed significant stock option trades for WorldCom  
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executives, while at the same time conducting proprietary trading in WorldCom 
stock and holding a significant position in the company’s stock through its asset 
management unit. Additionally, Citigroup advised the WorldCom CEO, financed 
margin purchases of company stock, and provided loans for one of his private 
businesses.  
On the one hand, Citigroup was very successfully engaged in the pursuit 
of revenue economies of scope (cross-selling), simultaneously targeting both the 
asset and liability sides of its client’s balance sheet, generating advisory fee 
income, managing assets, and meeting the private banking needs of WorldCom’s 
CEO. On the other hand, that same success caught the firm in simultaneous 
conflicts of interest relating to retail investors, institutional fund managers, 
WorldCom executives and shareholders as well as Citigroup’s own positions in 
WorldCom credit exposure and stock trades. WorldCom’s bankruptcy triggered a 
large market capitalization loss for Citigroup’s own shareholders, only part of 
which can be explained by a $2.65 billion civil settlement the firm reached with 
investors in May 2004.
16 
It seems plausible that the broader the range of services that a financial 
firm provides to a given client in the market, and the greater the cross-selling 
pressure, the greater the potential likelihood that conflicts of interest will be 
compounded in any given case and, when these conflicts of interest are 
exploited, the more likely they are to damage the market value of the financial 
firm’s business franchise once they come to light. Similarly, the more active a 
financial intermediary becomes in principal transactions such as affiliated private 
equity businesses and hedge funds, the more exposed it is likely to be to 
reputational risk related to conflicts of interest. 
                                                 
16 Similar issues surfaced in the case of the 2001 Enron bankruptcy. See Batson (2003) and 
Healy & Palepu (2003).  
  22 
5. Controlling Conflicts of Interest 
Mechanisms to control conflicts of interest are based on either regulation, 
civil litigation or market discipline - often a combination. These external controls, 
in turn, form the basis for a set of internal controls, which can be either prohibitive 
or affirmative, involving in the first instance the behavioral “tone” and incentives 
set by boards and senior management together with reliance on the loyalty and 
professional conduct of employees. They are fundamentally matters of sound 
corporate governance. 
Regulatory control of conflicts of interest tends to be applied through both 
SROs and public agencies, and is generally anchored in banking, insurance, 
securities and consumer protection legislation that is supposed to govern market 
practices. Its failure to prevent serious exploitation of conflicts of interest became 
evident in the US and elsewhere during the early 2000s with serial revelations of 
misconduct by financial intermediaries. The corrective initiative in this instance 
was taken not by the responsible SROs (the NYSE or the NASD, for example) or 
by the national regulators (such as the SEC), but in large measure by the New 
York State Attorney General under the Martin Act, a 1921 state law aimed at 
securities fraud which survived all subsequent banking and securities legislation 
and was bolstered in 1955 with the addition of criminal penalties. The Act 
contains extremely broad “fraud” provisions and conveys unusually wide 
discovery and subpoena power, but had been largely dormant until the 2001-02 
revelations of the excesses in financial market practices and corporate 
governance. The de facto ceding of enforcement actions by the SROs and the 
SEC to a state prosecutor (later joined by several others) focused attention on 
gaps in regulation and led to a burst of activity by the SROs, the regulators and 
the Congress, including the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It also led to a large 
number nolo contendere settlements by major banks and securities firms, none 
of which created any useful legal guidance for the future. 
Civil litigation proved to be an important component of external control of  
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financial intermediary conduct, especially when linked to regulatory sanctions. 
Despite high costs and occasional unjust outcomes, US tort litigation is arguably 
an important adjunct to market discipline with respect to exploitation of conflicts 
of interest. Nevertheless, both regulatory action and civil litigation are blunt 
instruments in dealing with exploitation of conflicts of interest in financial 
intermediaries, conflicts that are often extremely granular and sometimes involve 
conduct that is “inappropriate” or “unethical” rather than “illegal” in terms of 
Exhibit 3. So market discipline via reputational impacts on share prices may 
provide a more consistent and durable basis for Internal defenses against 
exploitation of conflicts of interest than those mandated by the regulators or 
implemented through the compliance infrastructure by legal staff reporting to 
senior management – or the threat of litigation. There are several linkages that 
can be identified. 
First, market discipline can leverage the effectiveness of regulatory 
actions. When they are announced, regulatory actions can have an adverse 
effect on a financial firm’s share price and competitive advantage linked to the 
share price such as the cost of capital, the ability to make acquisitions and 
vulnerability to takeover, and management compensation. As noted, any such 
share-price effects reflect the market’s response to the prospective combined 
impact of regulatory actions on revenues, costs and exposure to risk. In addition, 
regulatory actions or abrupt share price declines can trigger derivative civil 
litigation. In extreme cases the firm could be taken over, broken up of go out of 
business. Awareness of these risks on the part of boards and managements  
ought to be reflected in compensation arrangements as well as organizational 
structure – effective separation in wholesale financial intermediation of trading, 
asset management and corporate finance, for example.  
Second, even in the absence of regulatory constraints - actions that are 
widely considered to be “unfair,” “unethical” or otherwise contrary to the external 
constraint system discussed earlier - will tend to be subject to market discipline  
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through its reputational impacts. In a competitive context, this will affect firm valuation 
through the revenue and risk dimensions identified in Exhibit 4, in particular. That is, 
even in the absence of regulatory constraints, management ought to be aware that 
efforts to avoid conflict of interest exploitation and other sources of reputational damage 
is likely to reinforce the value of the firm as a going concern and, with properly 
structured incentives, their own rewards. Since they tend to be more granular and 
applied in a real-time context, market discipline constraints can reach the more opaque 
risks to reputational capital, including conflict of interest exploitation. It can identify such 
issues as they occur in real time, which external regulation normally cannot do. 
Third, since market-conduct regulation tends to be linked to be information 
asymmetries and transactions costs, optimum regulation should be carefully tailored to 
market domain – notably the wholesale and retail domains. Often this is not possible, 
resulting in overregulation in some areas and underregulation in others. Market 
discipline-based constraints can help alleviate this problem by permitting lower overall 
levels of regulation. Particularly in the case of conflicts of interest that bridge the 
wholesale and retail domains, market discipline can be effective in dealing with fault-
lines across financial market segments. And, just as market discipline can reinforce the 
effectiveness of regulation, it can also can serve as a precursor of sensible regulatory 
change. 
Fourth, market structure and competition across strategic groups can help 
determine the effectiveness of market discipline. For example, inside information 
accessible to a bank as lender to a target firm would almost certainly preclude its 
affiliated investment banking unit from acting as an adviser to a potential acquirer. An 
entrepreneur may not want his or her private banking affairs handled by a bank that also 
controls his or her business financing. A broker may be encouraged by a firm’s 
compensation arrangements to sell in-house mutual funds or externally-managed funds 
with high fees under “revenue-sharing” arrangements, as opposed to funds that would 
better suit the client’s needs. Market discipline that helps avoid exploitation of such 
conflicts of interest may be limited if most of the competition is coming from financial  
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conglomerates that face the same issues. But if the playing field is also populated by 
aggressive insurance companies, broker-dealers, fund managers and other “monoline” 
specialists, market discipline may be much more effective. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have attempted to define reputational risk and to outline the sources of such 
risk facing financial services firms. It then considered the key drivers of reputational risk 
in the presence of transactions costs and imperfect information and surveyed available 
empirical research on the impact of reputational losses imposed on financial 
intermediaries. We then developed the link between reputational risk and exploitation of 
conflicts of interest, arguably one of the most important threats to the reputational 
capital of a financial intermediary. Finally, we considered managerial requisites for 
dealing with both reputational risk and conflicts of interest.  
We conclude that market discipline, through the reputation-effects on the 
franchise value of financial intermediaries, can be a powerful complement to regulation 
and civil litigation. Nevertheless, market discipline-based controls remain controversial. 
Financial firms continue to encounter serious instances of reputation loss due to 
misconduct despite its effects on the value of their franchises. This suggests material 
lapses in the governance process.  
Dealing with reputational risk and controlling exploitation of conflicts of interest 
can be an expensive business, with compliance systems that are costly to maintain and 
various types of walls between business units and functions that impose significant 
opportunity costs due to inefficient use of information within the organization. Moreover, 
management of certain kinds of conflicts in multifunctional financial firms may be 
sufficiently difficult to require structural remediation. On the other hand, reputation 
losses associated with conflict of interest exploitation can cause serious damage - as 
demonstrated by reputation-sensitive “accidents” that seem to occur repeatedly in the 
financial services industry. Indeed, it can be argued that such issues contribute to 
market valuations among financial conglomerates that fall below valuations of more  
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specialized financial services businesses. (Laeven & Levine, 2005; Schmid & Walter, 
2006).
17 
  Managements and boards of financial intermediaries must be convinced that a 
good defense is as important as a good offense in determining sustainable competitive 
performance. This is something that is extraordinarily difficult to put into practice in a 
highly competitive environment for both financial services and for the highly skilled 
professionals that comprise the industry. It seems to require an unusual degree of 
senior management leadership and commitment. (Smith & Walter, 1997) Internally, 
there have to be mechanisms that reinforce the loyalty and professional conduct of 
employees. Externally, there has to be careful and sustained attention to reputation and 
competition as disciplinary mechanisms. In the end, it is probably leadership more than 
anything else that separates winners from losers over the long term – the notion that 
appropriate professional behavior reinforced by a sense of belonging to a quality 
franchise constitutes a decisive comparative advantage. 
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Exhibit 6
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for Banks and Insurers
In a Large-Sample Study of Operational and Reputational Evente
(three-factor models)
J. David Cummins, Christopher M. Lewis and Ran Wei, “The Market Impact of Operational Risk Events for US Banks and Insurers,”
Journal of Banking and Finance, . Volume 30, Issue 10, October 2006, Pages 2605-2634.   
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Source: De Fontnouvelle, Patrick, Virginia DeJesus-Rueff, John S. Jordan and Eric S. Rosengren (2006). Capital and Risk: New Evidence on Implications 
of Large Operational Losses.” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Working Paper. September.
Exhibit 7 - Operational Losses by Event Type            
 
Source: De Fontnouvelle, Patrick, Virginia DeJesus-Rueff, John S. Jordan and Eric S. Rosengren (2006). Capital and Risk: New Evidence on Implications 
of Large Operational Losses.” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Working Paper. September.





Reputational Impact and Share Prices
Pilot Study - 49 Events, 1998-2005 (unweighted mean CARs)
Gayle De Long, Anthony Saunders and Ingo Walter, “Pricing Reputation-Sensitive Events in Banking and Financial Services,”
New York University, Department of Finance Working Paper (in draft).  
Exhibit 10
Relative CARs - Reputational Loss Pilot Study
Gayle De Long, Anthony Saunders and Ingo Walter, “Pricing Reputation-Sensitive Events in Banking and Financial Services,”
New York University, Department of Finance Working Paper (in draft).
Cumulative Abnornal Returns - Statistical Summary
Event window (-5,3) (-5,10) (-1,3) (-1,10)
MEAN -6.24% -7.02% -6.79% -7.57%
Patell Z-score -10.02 -7.63 -14.37 -9.41
MEDIAN -4.59% -4.92% -4.55% -4.96%
Bottom 95% loss -38.17% -44.97% -35.88% -44.37%
Bottom 99% loss -62.57% -47.52% -63.78% -48.73%
90% skew -1.0907 0.1740 -1.2563 0.0538





Absolute CARs - Reputational Loss Pilot Study
Reputational Losses in Market Capitalization - Statistical Summary
Event window (-5,3) (-5,10) (-1,3) (-1,10)
MEAN -$3,300,009 -$3,485,131 -$1,765,038 -$1,950,161
p-value 0.0000 0.0013 0.0007 0.0049
MEDIAN -$984,421 -$555,256 -$700,940 -$616,721
Bottom 95% loss -$14,875,021 -$24,140,182 -$10,704,029 -$13,227,960
Bottom 99% loss -$18,375,026 -$28,360,334 -$13,971,351 -$20,261,036
90% skew -1.5269 0.2562 -0.5088 -1.3309
90% kurtosis 2.4720 -0.4915 0.1960 1.6990
Gayle De Long, Anthony Saunders and Ingo Walter, “Pricing Reputation-Sensitive Events in Banking and Financial Services,”













Decomposing CARs Related to Earnings Restatements
Data: All SEC enforcement actions 1978-2002 – 2,532 regulatory events
Actions & penalties tracked through 15 November 2005
Mean CAR -38.06% = mean market value loss $397 million (24% higher for surviving firms)
Partitioned for sample:
Fines imposed on firms $5.01 billion
Class action payments $ 8.59 billion
Accounting write-off $37.4 billion
Reputation loss $101.5 billion
SourceKarpoff, Jonathan M., Lee, D. Scott and Martin, Gerald S., "The Cost to Firms of  Cooking the Books" (March 8, 2006). 
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